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Abstract: The religious, theological and philosophical discourse in Late Antiquity 
concerning the human soul, the Greek psuchē, reveals a sophisticated and complex 
psychological language that was aimed at conceptualizing and articulating the act of 
conversion. The analysis of Gnostic, Orthodox Christian, and Neoplatonic writings in 
relation to the psuchē shows the cardinal role that this term played in formulating 
individual processes of mental transformation. Attributing active agency, mutability and 
relational aspect to the individual psuchē turned it into a unique conceptual device, 
necessary to define anew the human condition.  
 
In his monograph, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety: Some aspects of religious 
experience from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine, written fifty years ago, Eric Robertson 
Dodds analyzes the different developments in thought in the second and third centuries 
AD as a general intellectual reaction to changes in the Roman world.2 In his first chapter 
‘Man and the Material World,’ he describes the devaluation of the universe in the early 
Christian centuries as progressive withdrawal of divinity from the material world and the 
corresponding devaluation of ordinary human experience. He describes the characteristic 
attitudes that developed in this era towards the world and the place of man within it as a 
product of a global sense of anxiety, which incited man to turn his back on the here and 
now – the visible cosmos – in favor of ‘mystical experiences’ of the soul.3 This seems to 
                                                 
1 I am thankful to Brain Stock, Inbar Graiver and Orna Harari for reading this article and for their 
invaluable comments.  
2 E. R. Dodds, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety: Some aspects of religious experience from 
Marcus Aurelius to Constantine (Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1965).  
3 We use here Dodds’ terminology. Note that we shall avoid the use of ‘mystical’ and ‘mysticism,’ in 
order not to differentiate between the religious, philosophical and psychological aspects of the ‘experiences’ 
attributed to the psuchē. See one of the best introductions to the phenomenology of mysticism: M. de 
Certeau, “Mysticism,” trans. Marsanne Brammer, Diacritics 22/2 (1992) pp. 11-25. 
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Dodds to be not only a sort of escapism, but even, in his words, “a collective cultural 
neurosis,” which he connects with Christian asceticism.4 The movement of man away 
from reality and towards a moral validation of invisibility is, according to Dodds, a 
product of “a wave of pessimism that swept over the West.”5 Using Freudian language, 
Dodds sees the soul as the means of dissociation, both external (separating a man from 
the reality that surrounds him) and internal (according to the Freudian ego-superego-id 
model).  
In Dodds’ reading, ‘mystical experiences’ express man’s search for unity, through 
which the perceiver realizes his own inner union.6 Dodds continues to look for what he 
calls a mystical philosophical discourse that provided a psychological reply to the 
questions of this ‘age of anxiety,’ and finds it in the two great thinkers of the third 
century: Plotinus and Origen.7 By avoiding sense-perception the psuchē gains a cardinal 
role as the means of connecting man not only to the divine, but also to man’s own 
existence in the universe. 
In what follows we shall examine the human soul as a theological and philosophical 
construct in order to reveal the definition of its new functions as a creative cultural means 
of an individual psychological process. We shall see that the construct of the human 
psuchē does not indicate a rupture between the visible and invisible world which Dodds 
identified as the characteristic of an ‘age of anxiety.’ It enables, instead, to resolve this 
tension by providing a means to create and develop new psychological strategies which 
provide man with control of both the visible and the invisible, the real and surreal 
dimensions of his existence. We shall start with the articulation of this process in 
philosophical and theological terms in Gnostic texts.  
 
The Gnostic psuchē 
The symbolic language of the myths recorded in the Gnostic texts known as the Nag 
Hammadi Collection attests to the development of a new religious language in the first 
centuries of the Christian era, which makes use of symbols such as soul, spirit, mind, 
wisdom and faith.8 Here we find the unification of man and God the Father through the 
                                                 
4 “In the recurrent topos of the flight of the soul through the universe – imagined as taking place in a 
dream, or after death, or sometimes just in waking contemplation – we can trace a growing contempt for all 
that may be done and suffered beneath the moon.” (Dodds, op. cit, p. 7).  
5 Ibid., p. 18.  
6 Ibid., p. 80.  
7 Ibid., pp. 83-128. Plotinus makes the entire universe the creation of the psuchē (Plotinus, Enneads, 
v.1.2.1ff, vol. 2, p. 261 in Plotini Opera, eds. Henry Paul and Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1964, Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1959, 1973), and conditions the meeting between the soul and God 
by the elimination of everything: Plotinus, Enneads, vi.7.34.12ff (vol. 3, p. 256ff), vi.9 (vol. 3, p. 322ff), 
following Dodds, op. cit., pp. 83-86).  
8 We have used the translations in the edition: The Nag Hammadi Scriptures, ed. Marvin Meyer. New 
York: HarperOne, 2008. 
14                                                 YOUVAL ROTMAN 
 
Youval Rotman, “Reconstructing Late Antique Psychology,”  Journal for Late Antique Religion and 
Culture 10 (2016) 12-37; ISSN 1754-517X; DOI: https://doi.org/10.18573/j.2016.10115; website: 
https://publications.cardiffuniversitypress.org/ 
 
nous, the mind, in order to obtain divine knowledge.9 We can also look at the way the 
creation of the world and the creation of man are constructed here, as well as the place of 
the human soul connected to Sophia (‘Wisdom’) “whom some call Pistis” (‘Faith’) which 
breathed spirit into man,10 or her daughter Zoe (‘Life’).11 In ‘On the Origin of the World,’ 
the tripartite Gnostic model is laid out, according to which man is created from body, 
spirit (the breath of the Wisdom of God), and soul. It is the soul, the last element received 
by man, which enables knowing (gnosis) God.12  
This process of ‘knowing’ God is further developed in the so-called ‘Exegesis of the 
Soul,’ which defines a new function to the human soul within the developing religious 
language.13 The myth tells the story of the fall of the soul (psuchē), a feminine entity of 
androgynous form, away from her union with the Father into the material world. This is 
followed by a process of repentance, which is also a process of regaining the knowledge 
(gnosis) she had originally. The soul is finally united with her bridegroom, who is sent to 
her from God:14 
 
Wise men of old gave the soul (psuchē) a feminine name. In reality she is female in her 
nature (phusis) as well. She even has her womb (mētra). As long as she was alone with 
the father, she was virgin and androgynous in form. But when she fell down into a body 
(sōma) and came to this life, then she fell into the hands of many robbers and men of 
hubris. And the wanton creatures passed her from one to another and soiled her. Some 
made use of her by force, while others did so by seducing her with a deceiving gift. In 
short, they defiled her, and she [was no longer] virgin. And she prostituted her body 
(sōma) and gave herself to one and all, considering each one she was about to embrace to 
be her husband. When she had given herself to wanton, unfaithful adulterers, so that they 
might make use of her, then she sighed deeply and repented. Thus when she turns her 
                                                 
9 In ‘Thunder/Thunder: Perfect Mind’ and in the ‘Discourse on the Eighth and Ninth,’ where the author 
adopts from Hermes the idea of the mind moving the soul into the divine mind (ibid., pp. 416-417).  
10 Note the tripartite Neo-platonic model of body, spirit and soul.  
11 See the creation of man by the spirit of Sophia, and the creation of the soul within him by Zoe her 
daughter (‘On the Origin of the World,’ ibid., pp. 213-214).  
12 Loc. cit.  
13 ‘The Exegesis on the Soul,’ trans. Marvin Meyer, ibid., pp. 223-234. Bibliography by Madeleine 
Scopello: L’Exégèse de l’âme, Nag Hammadi Codex II, 6: Introduction, traduction et commentaire 
(Leiden: Brill, 1985). Ead., Femme, gnose et manichéisme: De l’espace mythique au territoire du réel 
(Leiden: Brill, 2005). Ead., “Jewish and Greek Heroines in the Nag Hammadi Library,” in Images of the 
Feminine in Gnosticism, ed. Karen L. King (Harrisburg Pe.: Trinity Press International, 2000) pp. 71-90. 
Ead., “Les ‘Testimonia’ dans le traité de l’Exégèse de l’âme,” Revue de l’histoire des religions 191 (1971) 
pp. 159-171. 
14 In the translation of William C. Robinson, copied from The Gnostic Society Library website, ‘The Nag 
Hammadi Library:’ http://www.gnosis.org/naghamm/exe.html on September 22nd, 2013, with alterations 
from Scopello: L’Exégèse de l’âme…, op.cit., pp. 103-110.  
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face from those adulterers, she runs to others and they compel her to live with them and 
made her their slave as masters upon their bed… 
As long as the soul (psuchē) keeps running about everywhere copulating (koinōnein) with 
whomever she meets and defiling herself, she exists suffering her just deserts. But when 
she perceives the straits she is in and weeps before the father and repents (metanoein), 
then the father will have mercy on her and he will make her womb (mētra) turn from the 
external domain and will turn it again inward, so that the soul will regain her proper 
character (merikon). For it is not so with a woman. For the womb of the body is inside the 
body like the other internal organs, but the womb of the soul is around the outside like the 
male genitalia which is external…  
And so the purification of the soul is to regain the newness of her former nature and to 
turn herself back again. That is her baptism (baptisma). Then she will begin to rage at 
herself like a woman in labor, who writhes and rages in the hour of delivery. But since 
she is female, by herself she is powerless to beget a child. From heaven the father sent her 
her man, who is her brother, the firstborn. Then the bridegroom came down to the bride. 
She gave up her former prostitution and cleansed herself of the pollutions of the 
adulterers, and she was renewed so as to be a bride… 
Then the bridegroom, according to the father's will, came down to her into the bridal 
chamber, which was prepared. And he decorated the bridal chamber. For since that 
marriage (gamos) is not like the carnal (sarikikos) marriage, those who are to have 
intercourse with one another will be satisfied with that intercourse (koinōnia). And as if it 
were a burden, they leave behind them the annoyance of physical desire and they turn 
their faces from each other. But this marriage (gamos) was not of this [kind], but once 
they unite with one another, they become a single life.  
 
In a captivating article, June Singer has attempted to read the mythical motion of the 
Gnostic soul as a psychological process of evolution of the individual, embedded with 
Jungian archetypes.15 For Singer, the Gnostic soul is the archetypal vessel that is given 
form in order to be able to carry the holy spark or seed that exists within each human 
being. She explains the myth as dealing not with repentance from sin, but with a process 
of turning away from ignorance in order to regain the gnosis that the soul once knew and 
has forgotten.16 She thus sees it not only as a process of purification from external 
contaminations, but of inner transformation away from suffering. This process of 
                                                 
15 June Singer, “The Evolution of the Soul,” in The Allure of Gnosticism: The Gnostic Experience in 
Jungian Psychology and Contemporary Culture, ed. Robert A. Segal (Peru Il.: Open Court, 1995) pp. 54-
69. See also Robert A. Segal, “Jung’s Fascination with Gonosticism,” in The Allure of Gnosticism…, op. 
cit., pp. 26-38; Christine Downing, “Towards an Erotics of the Psyche,” Journal of the American Academy 
of Religion 44 (1976) pp 629-638. For a Jungian reading of Christian symbolism see: C. G. Jung, CW 9ii, v, 
§ 68ff (=“Christ, a Symbol of the Self”).   
16 Which in Jungian terms would be identical with the ‘individuation process’ (loc. cit.).  
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transformation is symbolized here by the unusual metaphor of turning the external womb 
inward in a sort of a return to the self, away from external stimuli towards the inner divine 
spark. This return inwards seems to symbolize both a psychological and a theological 
process.17 It enables a gnosis of both the inner soul and the divine spark which it contains, 
and through it of God whose grace is indispensable for the reunification of the soul with 
the divine.18 This process of return through ‘introversion’ of the soul is her ‘conversion’ 
(Greek: epistrophē), a necessary process of perfection to become whole again and at one 
with her divine origin, which is the meaning here of her redemption and salvation.19  
This text reveals clearly the new function of the soul as a means of religious and 
psychological transformation via repentance, return and conversion.20 Thus belief is 
perceived as a transformation of the psuchē, which is also a psychological process 
composed of repentance and conversion as return (Greek: epistrophē), in order to gain 
belief and knowledge in its divine part as we see in the ‘Exegesis of the Soul.’21 In this, 
the Gnostic text does the opposite of what Dodds claims. Not only does it not validate the 
rupture between the visible and invisible world that Dodds identifies as the characteristic 
of an ‘age of anxiety,’ but it resolves it through a psychological strategy and by using the 
human psuchē as an instrument. The very idea that the human soul can experience epi-
strophē – a conversion as a reversion to its original values in order to unite the two worlds, 
the external and the internal –  gives man control of both the visible and the invisible, the 
real and surreal dimensions of his existence. It inverts the anxiety, and transforms it into a 
reconciliation of the conflict between external and internal aspects of the human soul in 
what June Singer identified as a psychological process of transformation. We find the 
same theme of a process of self-transformation as a conversion-reversion of the psuchē-
soul and her return to God through a psychological introversion in the theology and 
philosophy of the period. 
 
                                                 
17 See Giovanni Filoramo, “The Transformation of the Inner Self in Gnostic and Hermetic Texts,” in 
Transformations of the Inner Self in Ancient Religions, eds. Jan Assmann, Guy G. Stroumsa (Leiden: Brill, 
1999) pp. 137-149.  
18 In Jungian terms, this is the unification of the soul and the self, which is the objective of the 
psychological process.  
19 This fits exactly the Jungian conceptualization of the psyche.  
20 See following note. Maddalena Scopello reads this text against the background of purity and pollution 
in Second-Temple Jewish and early Christian apocryphal texts: ead., L’exégèse de l’âme…, op. cit., 57ff. 
She questions whether this text should be considered Gnostic at all, but concludes that in spite of its 
Romanesque character, it reflects a simplified reading of Gnostic thought (ibid., pp. 95-100).  
21 In the ‘On the Origin of the World’ the end of age is symbolized by the return of the rule of Pistis 
Sophia (The Nag Hammadi Scriptures, p. 292) who will drive out the gods of chaos and light overcomes 
darkness (ibid., pp. 220-221). For the relation between ecstasy, psuchē and Pistis Sophia see: Pistis Sophia. 
This Gnostic text concerns the repentance and salvation of Pistis Sophia, whom Jesus finds below the 
thirteenth aeon (ibid., i.34-36, pp. 51-52).  
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The theological functionality of the psuchē  
Much like Origen (c. 184/175-c. 253/254), who uses an apparently Platonic discourse 
in order to present the soul as a link to God as part of the cosmic theology that he con-
structs in his ‘On the First Principles’ (De principiis), 22 his contemporary Tertullian (c. 
155-c. 240) was also interested in the nature of the soul and dedicated two essays to the 
anima.23 
 
It’s too bad, I suppose, that the Law has come forth from Judaea and not from Greece. It is 
regrettable too that Christ chose fishermen instead of sophists to preach his doctrine. The 
philosophers with their vaporings becloud the clear sky of truth. These must Christians 
disperse, scattering the teachings of the philosophers about the origin of things by using 
the heavenly teachings of the Lord. Thus, the doctrines by which the pagans are deceived 
and the faith of Christians weakened will be destroyed.24  
 
This is how Tertullian chooses to open his De anima – ‘On the Soul’ – setting himself 
not only against the philosophers in the first three chapters, but also against Greek philo-
                                                 
22 PG 11:218-225 (=Origen, “On the First Principles,” ii.8: De anima, analysis infra). See Patricia Cox 
Miller, “Shifting Selves in Late Antiquity,” in Religion and the Self in Antiquity, eds. David Brakke, 
Michael L. Satlow and Steven Weitzman (Bloomington In.: Indiana University Press, 2005) pp. 15-39. For 
an analysis of his diversion (consciously or unconsciously) from Plato’s psuchē as he perceived it see Mark 
Julian Edwards, Origen against Plato (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002) ch. 3. Note that De principiis came down 
to us in its Latin translation. For Paul see Theo K. Heckel, “Body and Soul in Saint Paul,” in Psyche and 
Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment, eds. 
John P. Wright and Paul Potter (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000) pp. 117-131.  
23 Tertullian, De anima, ed. J. H. Waszink, in Tertullian, Opera, ed. Dom Eligius Dekkers (Turnout: 
Brepols, “CCSL II,” 1954) vol. 1, vol. 2, pp. 779-869, trans. Edwin A. Quain in Tertulian Apologetical 
Works and Minucius Felix Octavius (Washington D.C.: The Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1962, pp. 
179-309). Tertullian, De testimonio animae, ed. R. Willems, in Tertullian, Opera, vol. 1, pp. 173-183. For 
the problems in this text see: Laura Nasrallah, An Ecstasy of Folly: Prophecy and Authority in Early 
Christianity (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 2003) pp. 111-114. Note that unlike the Stoic 
Latin authors who used animus for the Greek psuchē (eg. Cicero), Christian Latin authors turn to anima 
keeping thus the Greek feminine. Augustine, on the other hand, uses anima and animus alternatively for the 
human soul and any other type of soul, while animus is also reserved for ‘mind’: Gerard J. P. O’Daly, 
“Anima, animus,” in Augustinus-Lexikon, ed. Cornelius Mayer, vol. 1 (Basel: Schwabe & Co. AG, 1986) 
pp. 315-340. Gerard J. P. O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley-Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1987) pp. 7-8. See infra nn. 34-35. 
24 Tertullian, De anima, iii.3: ‘Deliquit, opinor, diuina doctrina ex Iudaea potius quam ex Graecia 
oriens. Errauit et Christus piscatores citius quam sophistam ad praeconium emittens. Si qua igitur in hunc 
modum de nidoribus philosophiae candidum et purum aerem ueritatis infuscant, ea erunt Christianis 
enubilanda et percutientibus argumentationes originales, id est philosophicas, et opponentibus definitiones 
caelestes, id est dominicas, ut et illa quibus ethnici a philosophia capiuntur, destruantur, et haec quibus 
fideles ab haeresi concutiuntur, retundantur’ (trans. E. A. Quain, op. cit. p.186).   
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sophy as such. We shall see, however, that he adopts much more than he would care to 
admit from Greek philosophy. In fact, no other means (be it rhetorical or terminological) 
existed, for him or for any subsequent Christian theologian, which would serve to develop 
and formulate their ideas about the Scriptures. Tertullian’s objective is to show that the 
human anima (rather than animus, see below) emanated from God’s breath (Latin: ex dei 
flatu), which he connects to the verse in Genesis 2:7, but in contrast to Platonism, he 
demonstrates that this is corporeal. The rhetorical means for showing the corporeality of 
the soul (corporalitas animae, De anima, vii.1) he demonstrates, following the Stoics, as 
the passions.25 The soul shares the pain of the body when the latter suffers from bruises, 
wounds, etc., while the body reflects the disabilities of the soul under the influence of 
anxiety, worry, or love, through sense perception.26 His objective, the corporeality of the 
soul, is indispensable in order to explain how the soul could suffer in hell.27 Nonetheless 
Tertullian’s analysis had to be constructed on the premise of the immortality of the soul. 
In other words, what becomes so central in the Christian discourse about the soul is the 
need to reconcile the paradox of the soul being both made (born and created) and 
corporeal (Stoicism) while being nonetheless immortal (Platonism) yet “not more than 
immortal.”28 This paradox is resolved through an exegesis of Scripture. The relationship 
between body and soul serves a new function here, in establishing the basis for Christian 
theology.29   
In both his treatises about the soul, De anima and De testimonio animae, Tertullian 
advances the idea that knowing God is a matter of the soul.30 The soul is the witness of 
                                                 
25 See his reference to Chryssipus: ibid., v.6. See H. von Staden, “Body, Soul, and Nerves: Epicurus, 
Herophilus, Erasistratus, the Stoics, and Galen,” in Psyche and Soma… op. cit., pp. 79-116. Jackie Pigeaud, 
La maladie de l’âme: Étude sur la relation de l’âme et du corps dans la tradition médico-philosophique 
antique (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1989) pp. 265-269.  
26 Tertullian, De anima, v.5, vi.5. Cf. Galen, Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequantur. In 
Claudii Galeni Pergamenti: Scripta Minora, vol. 2, ed. Johannes Müller (Amsterdam: A. M. Hakkert, 1967 
=Leipzig: Teubner, 1891) pp. 32-79. There are many parallels between Tertullian and Galen in the role that 
they attribute to the psuchē. This study is a part of a larger project that analyzes also the medical concept-
ualization of the psuchē in Late Antiquity.  
27 Tertullian, De anima, vii.2-3. 
28 Ibid., iii.2. See Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Tryphon, ed. Miroslav Marcovich, Justini Martyris 
Dialogus cum Tryphone (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1997) dia.1.5 (p. 71): ‘others maintain that the psuchē is 
immortal and incorporeal (Greek: athanaos kai asōmatos), they think that they will not be punished for 
their bad actions since the incorporeal is not affected (apthes gar to asōmaton). And otherwise that since 
the psuchē is immortal they do not need God.’ For a full discussion about the immortality and corporeality 
of the soul see ibid., dia. 4.1-6.2 (pp. 76-82).  
29 Guy Stroumsa, “ ‘Caro salutis cardo’: Shaping the Person in Early Christian Thought”, History of 
Religions 30/1 (1990) pp. 25-50. See PG 11:218-225 (=Origen, “On the First Principles,” ii.8: De anima).  
30 Knowing God is attributed to the psuchē and not to the mind: Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Tryphon, 
op. cit., dia. 4.2 (p. 77).  
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truth because it comes from God and hence knows him.31 This Christian belief (opinio 
christiana) according to which the soul can experience and feel (in contrast to knowing 
through philosophy), Tertullian explains, is perceived by non-Christians as delusion 
(vanitas), folly (stupora) and presumption (praesumptio).32 Thus it is this belief that he 
wishes to validate. For this purpose he constructs a model of the soul, which is based on 
sense perception and cognitive capacities.33  
Tertullian shows how the body’s functions (affections, temperaments, sense perception) 
determine mental capacities, and attributes them to the animus (mind, “which the Greek 
call nous”), which is, he explains, a faculty within the soul, by which it gains knowledge.34 
However, the animus (mind) is not distinct from the anima (soul), but is inseparable from 
it, and acts as both its capacity and instrument: “its slave and not its master.”35 Moreover, 
it acts in complete agreement with sense-perception. The senses are the basis of any ex-
perience and thought, and any misconception of the truth is due to disorder of interpretation 
or opinion (hence the mental capacity), rather than the functioning of the senses.36 The 
soul cannot perceive what the body feels without its mental capacity (animus).37 But, 
“when a man is demented (dementit homo), the soul is demented (anima dementit), and 
the mind (animus), far from being separated from it, is the fellow sufferer of the soul. In 
fact, the soul is the principal sufferer in such a contingency. Thus when the soul leaves 
                                                 
31 Tertullian, De testimonio animae, ii.6 (p. 177). 
32 Ibid., iv (pp. 178-180).  
33 For Tertullian drawing on Soranus of Ephesus’ De anima see Nasrallah, op. cit., ch. 3: ‘Tertullian and 
the soul’s condition,’ p. 114, n. 58.  
34 Tertullian, De anima, xii.1 (p. 797). Note that here we can discern the terminological gap between the 
Greek and the Latin, that caused divergence also within the Latin discourse. Cf. Cicero, Tusculan Dis-
putations, ed. Georges Fohlen, trans. Jules Humbert, 2 vols. (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1964, 1968). While 
Cicero uses the Latin animus for the Greek psuchē, Tertullian sticks to the feminine form and uses anima. 
In fact Cicero’s anima and animus are swapped here. Anima is here the psuchē, and animus is the mental 
capacities of the psuchē, see following note and cf. O’Daly, “Anima, animus”, op. cit. on Augustine’s 
terminology in this matter (supra n. 23). 
35 Tertullian, De anima, xii-xiii. Cf. Erasistratus who made the nervous system the instrument of the 
psuchē: von Staden, op. cit.: The soul may have multiple powers, capabilities, operations, faculties, but they 
are really organic parts of a single living being: the soul is one undivided entity in contrast to the views of 
Plato, Zeno, Aristotle, Panaetius, Soranus and Chryssipus, who divide it into two, three, five, six, seven and 
eight respectively (Tertullian, De anima, xiv.1-2, p. 799).  
36 Ibid., xvii.9 (p. 805) where Tertullian brings examples of Greek tragedies: Orestes, who looking at his 
sister perceives her as his mother, and Ajax who seeing Ulysses in the slaughtered cattle: these are not de-
fective visions, but insania – a disorder in the perception of the senses. Cf. Ps.-Plutarch, Opinions of the 
philosophers (Placita philosophorum) in Plutarch, Œuvres morales, ed. and trans. Guy Lachenaud, vol. 12, 
pt. 2: Opinions des philosophes (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2003) iv.12 (pp. 153-154), where the case of 
Orestes’ visual misperception is an example of an illusion (phantasma), the creation of the wrong effect in 
the psuchē in view of the object perceived. This is, the author says, what characterizes the state of melan-
cholia and mania.  
37 Tertullian, De anima, xviii.6-9 (p. 808).  
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the body upon death, the mind leaves it too, being joined to the soul.”38 Tertullian defines 
the soul as a means of connecting between man and God, which is actually what his 
treaty is all about. The soul is the bearer of the proofs of Christian faith, not books or 
knowledge.39 This is very similar to the role that Origen and Plotinus attributed to the 
soul, as revealed by Patricia Cox Miller, in connecting the man to the divine.40 The 
human soul therefore replaces philosophy, since it perceives true divine knowledge 
through its dual capacities: sensing and knowing. In a word, anima is what enables man 
to know God through the senses.41 This is also where Tertullian diverges from the Stoics. 
Being spirit, the soul cannot be body.42 This distinction is the reason why true knowledge 
of God cannot come from sense-perception and cognitive knowledge.43 So how can man 
experience God if the soul is distinct from the body? To answer this, Tertullian breaks 
away completely from what he said so far, in order to present the other side of his model: 
the soul’s dissociation from both its mental and sensation capacities (i.e. the body) when 
it is in a state of ecstasy.  
Tertullian’s move aims to resolve the paradox Christianity introduced into the Stoic 
versus Platonic discourse about the soul. The soul cannot be both body (Stoicism) and 
immortal (Platonism). For Tertullian, the soul is indeed immortal (otherwise there can be 
no hell and no resurrection), but it is also corporeal (otherwise it cannot suffer).44 But 
since he cannot but acknowledge that death does separate between soul and body, and 
that the body is mortal, the soul must be corporeal but cannot be body.45  Hence, the soul 
must have some means of connection with God other than via knowledge through the 
body or sense-perception. The soul “would appear not to be body, since its motion is not 
governed by the laws of bodily motion.”46 And this is the reason why sleeping, dreaming 
and especially ecstasy become so central to Tertullian’s argument: they exemplify the 
soul’s motion independently of the body.  
                                                 
38 Ibid., xviii.9-10 (pp. 808-809), trans. E. A. Quain, op. cit., p. 221 (with my alterations).  
39 Tertullian, De testimonio animae, i (pp. 175-176). 
40 Miller, op. cit. 
41 Since, as Tertullian shows no experiencing or intelligence is possible without the senses of the body: 
Tertullian, De anima, xvii.9 (p. 805).  
42 Ibid., v.2-3 (pp. 786-787).  
43 Here lies the difference that the Christian authors establish between knowledge through the soul without 
the body from the one hand, and knowledge through perception from the other hand, which is manifested in 
the sin of eating of the Tree of knowledge of Good and Bad.   
44 Ibid., vii.3 (p. 790).  
45 Ibid., v.6, l1 (p.787, 857).This is exactly where Galen too diverges from Stoicism but for other reasons 
and in a totally different direction (Galen, op. cit., von Staden, op. cit.). Cf. Justin Martyr, Dialogue with 
Tryphon, op. cit., dia. 6.1-2 (pp. 81-81).  
46 ‘Anima autem nec extrinsecus mouebitur, ut quae non sit inanimalis, nec intrinsecus, ut quae ipsa 
potius moueat corpus. Itaque non uideri eam corpus, quae non corporalium forma ex aliqua regione 
moueatur,’ Tertullian, De anima, vi.1 (p. 788).  
   RECONSTRUCTING LATE ANTIQUE PSYCHOLOGY                                 21 
 
Youval Rotman, “Reconstructing Late Antique Psychology,”  Journal for Late Antique Religion and 
Culture 10 (2016) 12-37; ISSN 1754-517X; DOI: https://doi.org/10.18573/j.2016.10115; website: 
https://publications.cardiffuniversitypress.org/ 
Sleep is for Tertullian an example par excellence to show a state of suspension of the 
activity of the senses.47 Sleep brings quiet to the body, but not to the soul. To Tertullian 
the soul is always in motion, since nothing that is immortal can be quiet. Hence the body 
which is mortal is quiet in sleep, but not the soul.48 The fact that the soul continues to be 
in motion is exemplified in dreams: although it does not depart from the body, it does the 
following: 
 
it wanders over land and sea, engages in trade, is excited, labors, plays, sorrows and 
rejoices, pursues the lawful and the unlawful, and clearly shows that it can accomplish 
much without the body, that it is supplied with members of its own, although showing the 
need it has of exercising its activity in the body once again. Thus, when the body 
awakens, it portrays before your eyes the resurrection of the dead by returning to its 
natural functions. There you have the natural explanation and the rational nature of sleep. 
Thus, by the image of death, you are introduced to faith, you nourish hope, you learn both 
how to live and die, you learn watchfulness even when you are asleep.49  
 
The soul, Tertullian explains, is in constant movement thanks to its immortality and 
divinity. He goes on to equate the soul’s main function in sleep to a gladiator’s motions 
without his weapons, when his actions bear no result.50 And this power of the soul, “a 
deprivation of the activity of the senses,” is what “we call ecstasy… [creating here a 
Latin term – ecstasis – by transliterating the Greek word ekstasis] which is an image of 
madness (Latin: amentiae instar).”51 Tertullian continues to develop this idea of a state of 
the soul – amentia – which instead of ‘madness’ or ‘insanity’ we propose to translate as 
a-mentia – ‘un-mindedness,’ i.e. the soul separated from the mind, its mental instrument. 
But how can the soul ‘remember’ its dreams (a mental capacity), if it is in a state of 
amentia, disconnected from the mind?52 This point is central to Tertullian’s argument, 
because he needs to demonstrate his argument that “we are affected by emotions in our 
dreams,” and not through the senses and the mind.53 He concludes that the peculiarity of 
this state of amentia does not destroy the mental functions, but only withdraws them 
                                                 
47 Cf. Galen’s use of sleep: Mark Ahonen, Mental Disorders in Ancient Philosophy (Cham: Springer, 
2014) p. 148ff.  
48 Tertullian, De anima, xliii (pp. 845-848).  
49 Ibid., xliii.12 (p. 848). 
50 Ibid., xlv.1-2 (p. 849).  
51 Ibid. xlv.3 (p. 849). See Therese Fuhrer, “Ecstasis,” in Augustinus-Lexikon, ed. Cornelius Mayer, vol. 
2 (Basel: Schwabe & Co. AG, 1994) pp. 736-738. 
52  Tertullian, De anima, xlv.5 (p. 850).  
53 Loc. cit. precisely in contrast to both Galen, Quod animi mores, op. cit. and Ps.-Plutarch, Opinions of 
the philosophers, op. cit., iv.13-20; 21 (pp. 153-161).  
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temporarily.54 This reasoning serves Tertullian to demonstrate the prophetic nature of 
dreams, and to show that to encounter and to know God is not a process of the senses-
mind-soul mechanism, but an encounter of the soul in a state of amentia.55 The soul is 
gifted with foresight (divinatio) “different from that capability of prophecy (prophēteia) 
and comes from the grace of God.”56 The touchstone for this proves to be the state of 
ecstasy that God set upon Adam in Genesis 2:21.57 “Thus, in the beginning, sleep was 
preceded by ecstasy, as we read: and God sent ecstasis upon Adam and he slept. Sleep 
brought rest to the body, but ecstasy came over the soul and prevented it from resting, 
and from that time this combination constitutes the natural and normal form of the 
dream.”58 In formulating this encounter with God as a psychological process, i.e. a 
movement of the psychē, Tertullian was not alone. 
 
The Neoplatonic psuchē 
 
Often have I woken up to my self out of the body and entered into my self, outside of 
other things, seeing a beauty of great wonder and trusting that then above all I belonged 
to the greater part, activating a best life and coming to identity with the divine, having 
being seated (hidrutheis) in it, coming to that actuality, seating my self (hidrutheis) above 
every other intelligible object, after that rest in the divine when I come down to reasoning 
                                                 
54 “The fact that we remember dreams is proof of the fundamental soundness of the mind, but the dulling 
of a sound mind while memory continues to function is a species of madness. In that state, therefore, we are 
not considered insane, but only dreaming, and hence to be in full possession of our faculties, the same as at 
any other time. Although the power of exercising these faculties is dimmed, it is not completely extinguished 
and, while control seems to be lacking just at the time when ecstasy is affecting us in a special manner, still 
it then brings before us images of wisdom as well as those of error” (Latin: Igitur quod memoria suppetit, 
sanitas mentis est; quod sanitas mentis salua memoria stupet, amentiae genus est. Ideoque non dicimur 
furere, sed somniare; ideo et prudentes, si quando, sumus. Sapere enim nostrum licet obumbretur, non 
tamen extinguitur, nisi quod et ipsum potest uideri uacare tunc, ecstasin autem hoc quoque operari de suo 
proprio, ut sic nobis sapientiae imagines inferat, quemadmodum et erroris)’, Tertullian, De anima, xlv.6 (p. 
850). 
55 Ibid., xlvi. As Tertullian said earlier in the same treaty about the soul’s motion: “Have we not shown 
elsewhere that the soul is moved by another in prophecy and madness” (ibid., vi.3). Here he proves that soul is 
corporeal yet moved from without. He then proceeds to divide dreams into three categories: (1) vain, deceitful 
and impure which emanate from the Devil; (2) True prophetic emanating from God; (3) dreams which the 
soul induce of itself by the attentive contemplation of its surroundings – the result is the what the soul 
endures when in ecstasy – i.e. “a special category as arising from ecstasy and its attendant circumstances” 
(ibid., xlvii). And he notes that encountering God in this state of dreaming requires fasting (ibid., xlviii).  
56 Ibid., xxii.1 (p. 814).  
57 Ibid., xxi. And here he joins Philo: Quis rerum divinarum heres, in id., Opera, eds. Paul Wendland 
and Leopold Cohn, vol. 3 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1962)  pp. 56-61 (249-266, chs. 51-53).  
58 Ibid., xlv.3 (p. 849), trans. Quain, p. 280. To Tertullian a true prophet must loose his own senses since 
is overshadowed by the power of God, and cannot know what he has said: Tertullian, Against Marcion (ed. 
Ae. Kroymann, in Tertullian, Opera, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 437-726) iv.22.4-5 (p. 601). Ecstasy is here amentia 
(loc. cit., and ibid., v.8.12, p. 688).  
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from Intellect, I am at a loss how I ever came down, and how my soul (psuchē) has come 
to be in the body (sōma) when she is what she has shown herself to be in herself.59  
 
No Church Father wrote this beautifully moving paragraph. It was Plotinus himself 
(c. 204/5-270) who documented his experiences for the purpose of the philosophy he was 
developing.60 We should refrain from using the term ‘mystical’ here to describe this sort 
of  experience, since the modern distinction between ‘mystical,’ ‘philosophical’ and 
‘psychological’ should be considered as anachronistic for the period in question.61 The 
                                                 
59 Plotinus, Enneads, op. cit. iv.8.1.1-11 (vol. 2, p. 224), here in the translation of Kevin Corrigan, 
Reading Plotinus: A Practical Introduction to Neoplatonism (West Lafayette In.: Purdue University Press, 
2004) p. 31 (cf. Henry and Schwyzer’s translation in Plotinus, eid. eds. vol. 3, p. 224: “Theologia I”). I am 
thankfull to Brian Stock who have suggested here to use Plotinus’ ‘my self’ instead of ‘myself’. Note that 
the verb hidruthēsthai can be translated as being seated, set or settled (settled down). Andrew Smith 
translates it as “setting myself” (Andrew Smith, Philosophy in Late Antiquity, London: Routledge, 2004, p. 
51). As Corrigan states, the active and the passive moments of Plotinus’ experience are evident in the active 
and passive participles of the verb “to seat” – hidruein (hidryein in Corrigan’s transliteration). Corrigan 
identifies here a tension between an entry into a deeper selfhood and the perplexity that one can find oneself 
back in ordinary, bodily consciousness.  
60 For the importance of personal ‘mystical’ experience in Neoplatonism see Antony Charles Lloyd, The 
Anatomy of Neoplatonism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) pp. 125-126: the hypostases are ex-
periences in Neoplatonism, and have ‘phenomenological properties,’ which cannot be themselves derived 
from the Neoplatonic philosophical system. For Plotinus’ practicing his philosophy, see Porphyry, Life of 
Plotinus, eds. Paul Henry and Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer, Plotini Opera, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1964) ch. 23 (pp. 31-32). This is Corrigan's analysis: “Porphyry tells us in his Life of Plotinus that Plotinus 
had genuine mystical experiences, and this passage seems to capture both the unity and perplexity of such 
experiences for Plotinus himself. Of course, ‘god’ is not only, above all, the One, but also Intellect and 
soul; even our intellects Plotinus calls divine, or the ‘god’ within. This passage, then, could describe union 
with Intellect, but the phrase ‘above every other intelligible object’ indicates that Plotinus probably is 
speaking of mystical union with the One. The active and the passive moments of such experience are 
evident in the active and passive participles of the verb ‘to seat’ (hidryein), and there is a tension between 
entry into a deeper selfhood and yet the perplexity that one can find oneself back in ordinary, bodily 
consciousness.” (Corrigan, op. cit., p. 31). ‘God,’ ‘Intellect,’ ‘One,’ ‘Soul’ have all of course precise 
meanings in the language of Plotinus, which this paper cannot unfortunately elaborate on. For Plotinus’ 
psychology we have consulted the following studies: Eyjólfuk Kjalar Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense-
Perception: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1988); id. Plotinus on 
Intellect (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007); Id. “Plotinus and soul-body dualism,” in Companions to Ancient 
Thought, 2. Psychology, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1991) pt. 8; 
Stephen R. L. Clark, “Plotinus: Body and Soul,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, ed. Lloyd P. 
Gerson (Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University Press) 1991, pt. 11. Henry J. Blumenthal, “On soul and 
intellect,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, op. cit., pt. 4; Lloyd P. Gerson, Plotinus (London-
New York: Routhledge, 1994) pt, III; Smith, op. cit., p. 18ff. Our main concern here is to understand the 
role that the Neoplatonic model attributes to ‘conversion’ as a process of return: epistrophē. See W. 
Beierwaltes, Selbsterkenntnis und Erfahrung der Einheit: Plotinus Enneades V 3: Text, Übersetzung, 
Interpretation, Erlauterungen (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991) pp. 175-182.  
61 M. de Certeau, op. cit. For Plotinus’ use of the term see previous note and Blumenthal, op. cit.  
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concept of the psuchē enabled the thinkers to define mystical, theological and, in 
Plotinus’ case mainly philosophical aspects as ‘psychological’ in the modern sense of the 
term. We can of course use the same argument the other way around, namely that the 
psychological needs of the individual were articulated by the creation of this language. 
This is what the journey of the Gnostic soul expresses, or in the words of Plotinus: “The 
real desire of our soul is for what is greater than herself.”62 This is precisely the objective 
of the process of conversion as a reversion: epistrophē as a change of awareness, not of 
location.63  
Our objective here is not to analyze this new language, nor shall we examine the use 
that Neoplatonism made of the psuchē. We should, however, consider that it has in-
fluenced and maybe even determined the conceptualization of conversion as both a 
psychological and theological process, and the definition of both as ‘spiritual’ (i.e. in 
contrast to the corporeal or somatic). There is a great deal that could be said about the 
parallel, if not joint development of Neoplatonism, Gnosticism and Christian theology.64 
What is essential for our purpose, however, is to understand that the Christian concept of 
the soul’s epistrophē as conversion had precise psychological and philosophical meanings 
which are made clear by the Gnostic and Neoplatonic writings. Though Plotinus’ paragraph 
cited above seems to describe an ecstatic (i.e. ‘mystical’) experience, we need first to 
understand it in philosophical terms, and to note the major difference between Plotinus’ 
means of self-transformation and the ekstasis of the psuchē as it was defined by early 
Christian thinkers.65 This difference was embodied in the place that Plotinus attributed in 
his model to the mind.  
Being Platonists, both Plotinus and Tertullian maintain a dissociation between the 
psuchē and its incorporeal body.66 Since the connection between psuchē and body was 
                                                 
62 Plotinus, Enneads i.4.6.17 (vol.1, p. 76), trans. Corrigan, op. cit., p. 32. For Plotinus this is what 
incites the soul to ascend up to Intellect, and sometimes through Intellect also to the One (ibid., pp. 32-33).  
63 Or, in the words of Lloyd: “content of consciousness or thought.” The meaning of epistrophē varies. 
Common to all is a process of conversion of the psuchē through its return to its internal source, hence 
reversion. It can also signify introversion. For the ambiguity of the term see Lloyd, op. cit., pp. 126-130. 
See Michael Atkinson’s commentary on the two notions of epistrophē in Plotinus: Plotinus: Ennead V. 1: 
On the ‘Three principal hypostases (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) p. 64. For Paul Aubin on the 
term see infra n. 84. .  
64 See Salvatore R. C. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), and even as far as theurgy is concerned: Birger A. Pearson 
Gnosticism and Christianity in Roman and Coptic Egypt (New York: T & T Clark International, 2004) ch. 
8, and bibliography on pp. 224-225, nn. 1-3.  
65 See Nasrallah, op. cit.  
66 For Plotinus’ soul-body relation see: Enneads iv.3.32.2-9, iv.7.8.2-3. Smith, op. cit., pp. 40-44. 
Blumenthal, op. cit.. See the analogy of light: the soul is to the body as the light is to air, independent of a 
substrate, which makes the soul an activity independent of a bodily substrate. In fact the objective here is to 
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defined first and foremost through sense-perception, they argued for a disconnection of 
the psuchē from sense-perception (from the activity that attaches it to the body). For 
Plotinus, however, the power of the senses is located in the soul, and perception is the 
soul’s active power which joins to external objects through incoming stimuli.67 The mission 
of the soul is to reach the higher level of being (‘the One’) by means of contemplation, 
but without being involved with or disturbed by the surrounding universe. This may be 
attained by disabling sensations so that they do not become perceptions.68 This, however, 
does not mean that the soul should negate all perceptions. On the contrary, the senses are 
proactive: they sense before mental perception is possible. However, perceptions of 
external objects should be suppressed in order to enable a process of self-perception and 
self-reflexivity through a process of introversion of the soul.69 Plotinus constructs his 
model in order to enable ascent by thought (noein). Cognitive capacities should be used 
with the objective of becoming godlike, since the soul can transcend to the One only by 
movement through the level of Intellect, as part of the process of return to herself.  
According to this perception, there are two contradictory movements within the unity 
of being: movement towards the external world, and the return to the internal principle of 
identity by Intellect.70 This return is realized through the soul’s perception of herself 
without any other objects – hence, self-reflexivity in the terms of Lloyd Gerson.71 This is 
the reason why the soul needs to turn away from the world towards Intellect in order to 
internalize herself, and this is why this is a conversion – epistrophē – as a movement of 
return, epistrophē pros heautē.72 
                                                                                                                                                 
use Intellect to achieve emancipation of the soul from the bodily substrate (Smith, op. cit., pp. 44-45: 
analysis of Enneads iv.5.6-7).  
67 Smith, op. cit., ch. 4: “Soul, the universe and matter”. The active power of the soul is expressed in the 
idea of ‘reading’ of the sounds for example: (ibid., p. 50). About the connection between the activities of 
the psuchē and the senses cf. Ps.-Plutarch, Opinions of the philosophers, op. cit., iv.10-18 (pp. 151-157).   
68 Plotinus, Enneads, v.1.12 (vol. 2, pp. 288-289). Smith, op. cit., pp. 50-53. But see a more complex 
explanation about Plotinus’ individual soul: Blumenthal, op. cit. and Remes Pauline, Plotinus on self: The 
philosophy of the ‘We’ (Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2007) pp. 85-91.  
69 Plotinus, Enneads vi.9.7 (vol. 3, p. 319).  
70 Pierre Hadot, “Epistrophè et metanoia dans l’histoire de la philosophie,” in Acts du XIème  Congrès 
International de Philosophie, Bruxelles. 20-26 août 1953, vol. 12: Histoire de la Philosophie: Méthodologie, 
Antiquité et Moyen Âge (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1953) pp. 31-36.  
71 Lloyd P. Gerson, “Epistrophē pros heauton: History and Meaning.” Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione 
filosofica medievale: An International Journal on the Philosophical Tradition from Late Antiquity to the 
Late Middle Ages of the Società Internazionale per lo Studio del Medioevo Latino (S.I.M.E.L.) 8 (1997): pp. 
1-32.  
72 According to Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self: The making of the modern identity, Cambridge Ma.: 
Harvard University Press, 1989, p. 111.) it is this inwardness which makes us “think of our thoughts, ideas, 
or feelings as being ‘within’ us, while the objects in the world which these mental states bear on are 
‘without’,” Cf. epistrophē pros heautē to anachorein eis heauton, ‘to retire into oneself’: André-Jean 
Festugière, Personal Religion among the Greeks (Berkeley Ca.: University of California Press, 1954) p. 
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In the paragraph cited above, which documents his own psychological experience, 
Plotinus emphasizes the act of reasoning (logismos). We should thus understand this 
experience not as ekstasis of the soul away from her cognitive capacities (in contrast to 
the mission that Tertullian gives to the soul), but as employing them on a different level 
of consciousness, in a word: as a philosophical and psychological practice.73 This, of 
course, joins the assertion of philosophers ever since Plato that philosophy is the only 
cure for the diseases of the soul, in spite of the development of the perception of diseases 
of the soul as mental incapacities caused by disorders in the nervous system.74  On the 
contrary, the fact that ‘diseases of the soul’ have become connected to the nervous system 
explains perfectly Plotinus’ emphasis on psychological transformation by dissolving 
altogether what for him is a hindrance of the body (enochlēsis tou sōmatos), i.e. the link 
between the senses and perception.75 This is precisely the function of the nervous system.  
Plotinus contrasts contemplation through seeing (i.e. perception by the eyes), which 
makes the soul reflect on external objects, with “another kind of seeing (allos tropos tou 
idein),” which he defines as “ekstasis and simplification (haplōsis) and giving oneself 
over (epidosis hautou), and pressing towards contact (ephesis pros haphēn) and stasis and 
a sustained thought leading to adaptation (perinoēsis pros epharmogēn).”76 This should 
not be understood as a part of a mystical experience.77 It signifies here a high level of 
consciousness which enables the use of the mind by reflection and thinking, but in a 
reflexive mode in order to avoid sense-perception, and hence external stimuli.78 It is an 
obligatory state in the soul’s mission to unite with the One, the Good. In this unification 
the soul connects herself to the mind, and actively thinks, perceives and reflects (noei): 
 
There the psuchē takes her rest and is outside evils because she has run up into the place 
which is clear of evils; and she thinks there, and is not passive (noei entautha kai apathēs 
                                                                                                                                                 
58ff.  In Plotinus’ model this is possible thanks to the psuchē’s two voices who create an inner dialogue. I 
am grateful to Brian Stock for this discussion. Cf. id., Augustine’s Inner Dialogue: The Philosophical 
Soliloquy in Late Anqituity (Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2010), ch. 2. 
73 Smith, op. cit., p. 13f. 
74 See Ahonen, op. cit., pp. 142ff.  
75 Plotinus, Enneads, vi.9.10.1f (vol. 3, p. 325).  
76 Plotinus uses here imagery about devotion through contemplation in a shrine: id., Enneads, vi.9.11.21-
25 (vol. 3, p. 327). Note that this is the only use of the term ekstasis in the Enneads (cf. Theiler, Plotinus 
Schriften, vol. 6, p. 174, reads Enneads vi.7.17.40 as ekstasis instead of ektasei: Eng. trans. A. H. Armstrong, 
7 vols. Cambridge Ma. Harvard University Press, “The Loeb Classical Library,” 1966-1988, vol. 7, p, 342, 
n.1). Note that Plotinus uses ekstatikē for a displacing motion (Enneads, vi.3.21.47, vol. 3, p. 125) and 
exestēkotes (Enneads, vi.8.2.7, vol. 3, p. 273) for persons who are deranged or beside themselves, together 
with those who suffer from mania (mainomenoi) and those caught by drugs or imaginations which they are 
not master.  
77 ‘Mystical’ in the modern sense of the term, although Plotinus uses the term ta mustēria for this philo-
sophical practice in the beginning of the tractate: Enneads, vi.9.11.1 (vol. 3, p. 326). 
78 Cf. Augustine’s inner dialogue (‘solilquy’), in Brian Stock, Augustine’s Inner Dialogue, op. cit., ch. 1.  
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entautha), and her true life is there; for our present life, the life without God, is a race of 
life imitating that life. But life in that realm is the active actuality of Intellect; and the 
active actuality generated gods in quiet contact with that Good, and generates beauty, and 
generates righteousness, and generates virtue. It is these the psuchē conceives (kuei) 
when filled with God, and this is her beginning and end; her beginning because she 
comes from thence, and her end because her good is there. And when she comes to be 
there she becomes herself and what she was; for what she is here and among the things of 
this world is a falling away and an exile and a ‘shedding of wings’ (kai en toutois ekptōsis 
kai phugē kai pterorueēsis).”79 
 
This description shows the transformation of the soul (and Plotinus’ personal ex-
perience as he documented it in the paragraph cited above) as a continuously active 
mental process which is the only way for salvation: 
 
The psuchē then in her natural state is in love with God and wants to be united with him; 
it is like the noble love of a girl for her noble father. But when the psuchē has come into 
the world of becoming and is deceived, so to say, by the blandishments of her suitors, she 
changes, bereft of her father, to a mortal love and is shamed; but again she comes to share 
her shames here below, and purifies (hagneusasa) herself of the things of this world and 
sets herself on the way to her father and fares well.
80   
 
This is a striking parallel to the Gnostic ‘Exegesis of the Soul,’ including the use of 
the same imagery of the prostitution of the soul, and its contamination by an earthly love 
which separates the soul from God, and makes her forget him.81 However, Plotinus 
makes it clear that the return of the soul, her epistrophē, to her source away from the 
body is a mental process of Intellect.  
We thus see how the new intellectual current of the time, whether Neoplatonist, 
Gnostic or Christian Orthodox, came to define and use the movement of the soul/psuchē 
in order to implement incorporeal processes as spiritual. Each current, however, defined 
the meaning of the movement of the psuchē differently. 
 
Conversion as a faculty of the soul 
In an illuminating article, Lloyd Gerson analyzes the changes in the use and meaning 
of the word epistrophē as part of the philosophical conceptual phrase of a ‘return towards 
                                                 
79 Plotinus, Enneads, vi.9. 9.13-24 (vol. 3, p. 323), trans. Armstrong, “The Loeb Classical Library,” vol. 
7, pp. 334-337 (p. 336, n. 1: ‘shedding of wings’ from Phaedrus 248c).  
80 Ibid., vi.9.9.33-38 (vol. 3, pp. 323-324, trans. Armstrong, “The Loeb Classical Library,” vol. 7, p. 
337). I use the term ‘salvation’ because Plotinus speaks here of a process of purification that is the only 
means for the soul to save herself from the other, earthly, prostitute’s love (hoion hetairistheisa) (ibid., 
vi.9.9.26-31).  
81 See: Scopello, L’Exégèse de l’âme, op. cit., pp. 159-160.  
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itself’ (epistrophē pros heauton) in ancient and medieval philosophy which he calls ‘self-
reflexivity.’82 His analysis reveals the Neoplatonic development of the process of self-re-
flexivity as the capacity for recognizing one’s own states without interpretation, which 
differentiates it from introspection.83 Epistrophē as self-reflexivity is to Plotinus an 
application or a specification of ‘conversion.’84 Two centuries later Proclus will base his 
structure on the fact that such a process depends completely on the desire of the psuchē, 
and that everything that is capable of epistrophē (epistreptikon) is non-corporeal 
(asōmaton), because epistrophē is conditioned by self-movement.85 In other words, 
Proclus makes any type of conversion solely dependent on the psuchē.86 What is striking 
is that simultaneously Christian authors  also struggled with the same problem of how the 
psuchē can return to the Good, the Father, the Source. They also use the term ‘conversion’ 
–  epistrophē, metastrophē –  i.e. return to the divine source.87 We should note however 
that here is a difference between Plotinus’ model of the individual psuchē and the models 
that Christian thinkers developed.88 As Paul Aubin shows, Christian authors developed 
their own tradition of employing the term, and in addition make extensive use of re-
                                                 
82 Gerson, “Epistrophē pros heauton...,” op. cit.  
83 For Plotinus, as Gerson explains, the act of thinking is primarily self-thinking, and self-thinking in 
itself is composed of self-reflexivity and self-knowledge of nous, while ‘the return toward oneself’ – hē 
epistrophē pros hauton – is a means to acquire this knowledge of itself. See his analyses of Ennead, 
v.3.13.13-17, v.9.1.50-51, and his translation of Enneads, vi.3.6.39-43: “In it (Intellect) there is no practical 
activity – for there is not even desire for what is absent in pure intellect – but in this return to itself (hē 
epistrophē pros hauton) demonstrates that it is not only probably but necessary that it have knowledge of 
itself. For otherwise what would its life be, it being separated from practical activity and in intellect?” 
(ibid., pp. 14-15).  
84 Ibid., pp. 20-21 Paul Aubin has found the roots of this perspective in the extensive and unusual use 
of the term by Epictetus: Paul Aubin, Le Problème de la « Conversion »: Étude sur un terme commun à 
l’Hellénisme et au Christianisme des trois premiers siècles (Paris: Beauchesne, 1963) pp. 59-66. Cf. 
Augustine’s use of the verb redire and the soul’s perception as a device towards mental perception: Stock, 
Augustine the Reader, op. cit., pp. 72-73.  
85 Gerson, “Epistrophē pros heauton…,” op. cit.,  pp. 19-20. Proclus, The Elements of Theology, ed. Eric 
Robertson Dodds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963) prop. 15-17, pp. 16-21.  
86 The triad monē-proodos-epistrophē forms the basic means of conceptualization of causation in 
Neoplatonic philosophy in terms of motion, and is attributed by Proclus (412-485) to Iamblicus (Gerson, 
“Epistrophē pros heauton…,” op. cit., p. 19f). In his The Elements of Theology, prop. 35 (p. 38) Proclus 
uses this triad in both his logics, as well as in his ontological process of creation. He states that such a 
process is possible only for entities who possess a psuchē, since the ‘return’/‘reversion’ – epistrophē – is a 
result of desire (possible only for souls). I am thankful to Orna Harari for this part. 
87 See in particular epistrophe linked to the psuchē in Origen, Homilies on Jeremiah (ed. Pierre Nautin, 
trans. id. and Pierre Husson, Homélies sur Jérémie. 2 vols., Paris: Éd. Du Cerf, “SC 232, 238,” 1976-1977) 
iv.1 (vol. 1, pp. 258-260), and ibid., xix.15 (vol. 2, pp. 242-244) following Aubin,  op. cit., p. 156.  
88 In very general terms, in Plotinus’ model part of the soul makes part of the One (supra n 68).  
   RECONSTRUCTING LATE ANTIQUE PSYCHOLOGY                                 29 
 
Youval Rotman, “Reconstructing Late Antique Psychology,”  Journal for Late Antique Religion and 
Culture 10 (2016) 12-37; ISSN 1754-517X; DOI: https://doi.org/10.18573/j.2016.10115; website: 
https://publications.cardiffuniversitypress.org/ 
pentance (metanoia, as we also see in the ‘Exegesis on the Soul’) which becomes the 
dominant term for any process of spiritual return.89 
Both William James and Arthur Darby Nock dedicated pioneering studies to the subject 
of conversion as a psychological means used by religious movements.90 Nock has defined 
conversion as: “The reorientation of the soul of an individual, his deliberate turning from 
indifference or from an earlier form of piety to another, a turning which implies a con-
sciousness that a great change is involved, that the old was wrong and the new is right. It 
is seen at its fullest in the positive response of a man to the choice set before him by the 
prophetic religions.”91 James, on the other hand, understands conversion in terms of its 
psychological, rather than intellectual effects, meaning a new level of consciousness and 
perception of the way in which the individual can see himself as a part of the surrounding 
universe: “What is attained is often an altogether new level of spiritual vitality, a relatively 
heroic level, in which impossible things have become possible, and new energies and en-
durances are shown. The personality is changed, the man is born anew, whether or not his 
psychological idiosyncrasies are what give the particular shape to his metamorphosis.”92  
In contrast to later works on the subject of early Christian conversion that analyzed it 
as social, cultural and political process of transformation, both Nock and James precieved 
the phenomenon of conversion as a private process of the individual.93 However, these 
two great thinkers have understood the process of conversion differently: one as an 
intellectual process and the other as emotional.  The psuchē became central to both types 
of change since, as we have seen, the psuchē was attributed with both intellectual and 
emotional denotations. Without the psuchē, therefore, there could be no conversion. The 
question is what kind of conversion was promoted by the early Christian authors? The 
answer to this must be both kinds. It is not a coincidence that the three Greek terms 
managed to lead both authors and scholars in different directions. The terms metanoia, 
                                                 
89 Aubin explains the similarity between Origen and Plotinus as a product of a shared Alexandrian  
philosophic training (ibid., pp. 155-157). See Hadot, op. cit.  
90 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: The Gifford Lectures delivered at Edinburgh 
1901-1902 (New York: The New American Library, 1958). Arthur Darby Nock, Conversion: The Old and 
the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo (London: Oxford University Press, 
1961). For a linguistic-psychological approach see Peter G. Stromberg, Language and self-transformation: 
A study of the Christian conversion narrative (Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1993).  
91 Nock, op. cit., p. 7.  
92 James, op. cit, p. 241.  
93 Among these studies: Nicholas H. Taylor, “The social nature of conversion in the early Christian 
world”, in Modelling Early Christianity: Social-scientific studies of the New Testament in its Context, ed. 
Philip F. Esler (London: Routledge, 1995) pp. 128-136; Thomas Finn, From Death to Rebirth: Ritual and 
Conversion in Antiquity (Mahwah NJ: Paulist, 1997); John Curran, “The Conversion of Rome Revisited” in 
Ethnicity and Culture in Late Antiquity, eds. Stephen Mitchell and Geoffrey Greatex (London: Duckworth 
and the Classical Press of Wales, 2000) pp. 1-14; Denise Kimber Buell, Why This New Race: Ethnic 
Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) ch. 5.   
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epistrophē and metastrophē were all used to model, structure and articulate what 
Christian conversion was all about. To put it simply, they were used in different ways by 
different authors. While metanoia primarily meant repentance, i.e. an intellectual process 
of inversion of values, both epistrophē and metastrophē were applied to the emotional 
and psychological (‘psychological’ in the modern sense) processes of transformation of 
the human psuchē. What is particularly remarkable is that, in contrast to Neoplatonism, 
Christianity, at least in its early stages, shows a considerable diversity of expressions of 
the process of conversion. What interests us here, however, is conversion as a faculty of 
the psuchē. And here it is striking that Christian authors have distinguished between its 
mental and non-mental aspects (we use ‘non-mental’ here to refer to phenomena that 
cannot be grasped by the mind following Tertullian’s conceptualization of a-mentia as 
‘un-mindedness – while we refrain from ‘emotional’ and ‘spiritual’). It is the non-mental 
which becomes a faculty of the psuchē in Christian texts.94  
In his Dialogue with Tryphon, Justin Martyr describes the process of conversion, 
epistrophē, and repentance, metanoia, as a cure for ‘disease of the soul’ (nosos psuchēs). 
God’s grace, an indispensible ingredient, is bestowed upon those whose soul is purified 
of all evil (ponēria).95 In describing the process of his own conversion, Justin contrasts 
two different types of what he calls ‘philosophy.’ The first is the philosophy that led him 
in search of God to Platonists, Pythagoreans, Stoics and Peripatetics. This direction 
failed, according to the argument, because the fact that the soul is immortal contradicts 
the fact that she can see God and understand the justification for her state in this life.96 In 
other words, the faculty of the mind or intellect (nous or dianoia) is not sufficient to 
encounter God.97 Justin then describes the process of his transformation, using the truth 
of the prophets, which came from seeing and hearing God: “This sparked a fire in my 
soul, and I was seized by love towards the prophets and those men, Christ’s friends. And 
having thought about these sayings within me, I found that this was the only certain and 
useful philosophy.”98 This method of knowing God, through revelation of prophecy, here 
negates seeing God through the mind (dia tou nou).99 Cognitive philosophy, which 
presented itself as the only means of attaining God and being united with him, is here 
                                                 
94 Although Hadot (op. cit.) has distinguished epistrophē and metanoia as Neoplatonic type of conversion 
and Christian type of conversion respectively, and argued that the metanoia is a radically different process 
of rebirth of the man, the two terms are used to describe the Christian experience of conversion. In his 
Ladder of Divine Ascent John Climacus connects together repentance and epistrophē to God (PG 88:764; 
829; 848). See also Origen, Homilies on Jeremiah, op. cit., above.   
95 Justin Martyr, op. cit., dia. 30.1 (p. 177), dia. 41.1 (p. 137).   
96 Ibid., dia. 4.4-7 (p. 78). Hence his conclusion: those philosophers knows nothing about these issues 
since they cannot say what the psuchē is (ibid., dia. 5.1, p. 79). And see the continuation of this argument in 
ibid., dia. 5.4-6.2 (pp. 80-82).  
97 Loc. cit.  
98 Ibid., dia. 7.1-8.2 (pp. 82-84).  
99 Ibid., dia. 3.7-4.5 (pp. 77-78).  
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demonstrated as useless.100 In this, it would appear, Justin makes use of the way in which 
Christian conversion is manifested in the Book of Acts (see Paul’s revelation in Ac. 9:3 
in addition to his ekstasis in Ac. 22:17), and makes it the only certain method of self-
transformation towards God, truth and salvation.101 Thus although the entire treatise is a 
dialogue of persuasion aimed at converting Jews, Justin here proves to be linked to 
Tertullian's later treatises which define revelation and ecstasy as the means of con-
viction.102 In the writings of Origen, Clement and Theodoret of Cyrrhus, however, this 
line is much more attenuated. Since the objective of these writers is to turn Christianity 
into philosophy, they emphasize the importance of cognitive and mental conviction. 
Moreover, like the philosophers, these authors attribute this faculty to the psuchē in order 
to explain conversion as a change (metathesis) and a return (epistrophē, metastrophē) to 
the divine.103  
The way these authors conceptualize the act of conversion cannot be separated from 
the way they understand and explain the very phenomenon of pistis (faith, belief, or con-
viction). Salvatore Lilla has shown that the concept of pistis is at the heart of Clement’s 
Christian doctrine.104 Influenced by both Philo and his contemporary Gnostics, Clement 
differentiates between faith, as an intellectual conviction resulting from demonstration 
and part of a process of knowing (gnosis), and between faith as a ‘higher form of 
knowledge,’ which is revealed through Scripture. Clement demands that both of these 
should be interpreted at the individual level. No true Christian conversion is possible 
without faith as a higher form of knowledge, since it is based on the revelation of 
Scripture.105 In his chapter on the prayer, Clement constructs this practice as a private 
means of conversing with God, following this ‘higher form of knowledge,’ i.e. through 
the ‘mystical’ encounter of the psuchē.106 According to John Clark Smith, Origen’s 
concept of Christian conversion is also a combination between cognitive conversion 
                                                 
100 Ibid., dia. 2.1 (p. 71). This is by negating the immortality of the soul with her capacity to perceive 
divine justices (dia. 5.4-6.2, pp. 80-82).  
101 It is remarkable that the negation of cognitive philosophy was done on a purely cognitive basis (loc. 
cit.).  
102 Cf. absence of the term ecstasy from Augustine’s  Confessions vii (Fuhrer, op. cit.). On Plotinus’ 
influence on Augustine’s conceptualization of mental process see Brian Stock, Augustine the Reader: 
Meditation, Self-Knowledge, and the Ethics of Interpretation (Cambridge Ma.-London: The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 1996) p. 65ff.  
103 Clement, Stromata iv.3.27-28 (ed. A. Van den Hoek, trans. Cl. Mondésert, Les Stromates: stromate 
iv, Paris: Éd. du Cerf, “SC 463,” 2001, pp. 100-102) in citing the Stoics, ibid., iv.16.100 (ibid., p. 222), 
vi.1.3 (ed. and trans. Patrick Descourtieux, Les Stromates: stromate vi, Paris: Éd. du Cerf, “SC 446,” 2001, 
p. 62).  
104 Lilla, op. cit., pp. 118-141.  
105 Clement, Stromata, vi.6.45.5-6 (pp. 152-154) and against the Gnostic: ibid., vi.8.71ff (p. 202 ff.).  
106 Ibid., vii.7 (ed. and trans. Alain Le Boulluec, Les Stromates: stromate vii, Paris: Éd. du Cerf, “SC 428,” 
1997, p. 128ff.).  
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through thought and perception, conversion of the individual’s behavior, as well as a 
spiritual return through the truth of the Scriptures.107 In any case, for both, conversion of 
faith is not merely an act of man through his psuchē, it is also conditioned by God’s 
desire to make this change, actualized by divine grace.108 This could be realized through 
revelation.109  
Here it is important to understand that conversion could not be merely cognitive, 
because pistis is no longer simply an intellectual conviction through demonstration, but 
also a non-mental belief, which gets its evidence from the Scriptures in a way which 
contradicts the Jewish legalistic interpretation. Hence it is precisely directed as the 
opposite of any act of intellect.110 The concept of conversion which these authors 
construct necessitates seeing the faculty of perceiving God as a faculty of the soul. 
Clement calls this a ‘psychic’ sense-perception, and intelligence capable of distinction 
(psuchikē aisthēsis kai diakritikē noēsis).111 For Origen, on the other hand, pistis is the 
new method for curing the soul (i.e. instead of philosophy), together with both its mental 
and non-mental aspects.112 This means that while still maintaining intellectual method as 
a means of salvation, for these authors the non-mental aspects are an inseparable part of 
any process of transformation.  
In his treaty ‘Cure of Hellenic Diseases’ (Ellēnikōn therapeutikē pathēmatōn), Theo-
doret of Cyrrhus (c. 393–.c 457) offers an elaborated discussion on the subject. His first 
book is dedicated to faith (pistis). He defines the disease of the soul (nosos tēs psuchēs) 
as absence of faith.113 His entire treaty is directed precisely to people who are afflicted 
with this disease.114 However, in contrast to both Clement and Origen, Theodoret 
differentiates faith from mind and intellect: “Without faith even the mind cannot see the 
intelligible things, since it is not possible to perceive invisible things without it.”115 The 
mind needs faith just as the body needs the eyes, since no truth can be attained without 
faith.116 This new state of awareness, as defined by Christian and Neoplatonist writers, 
was connected both in theory and practice to ecstasy.117 
                                                 
107John Clark Smith, “Conversion in Origen,” Scottish Journal of Theology 32/2 (1979) pp. 217-240.   
108 Clement, Stromata, vi.2.28 (pp. 114-116), who emphasizes God’s desire, but does not name it grace.  
109 Ibid., vi.3.34 (pp. 128-130).  
110 As is described in Justin's Dialogue against Tryphon. Lilla, op. cit., pp. 118-141. 
111 Clement, Stromata, vii.7.36.5-37 (pp. 134-136).  
112 Origen, Contra Celsum viii.51 (PG 11:1592c-1594a).  
113 Theodoret of Cyrrhus, Cure for Hellenic Diseases, i.1-8 (ed. and trans. Pierre Canivet, Thérapeutique 
des Maladies helléniques, 2 vols., Paris: Éd. du Cerf, “SC 57.1-2,” 2000-2001, vol. 1, pp. 104-105).  
114 Just like “the treatment of madmen is consisting of tying up the insane patient in order to inflict medical 
procedures on him,” Theodoret means to treat those who suffer from disbelief (loc. cit.). 
115 Ibid., i.72ff (vol. 1, pp. 123-4) developing a citation of Parmenides of Elea 
116 Ibid., i.78 (vol. 1, p. 124), i.127-128 (vol. 1, p. 136).  
117 The present study does not include a discussion on Augustine’ psychology and its relation to con-
version and the beliver’s conviction. See O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, op. cit., ch/. 2; Brian 
Stock, Augustine the Reader, op. cit. ; id., Augustine’s Inner Dialogue, op. cit.  
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Ecstasy between perfection and madness 
A contemporary of Theodoret, John Cassian (c. 360–435), devotes considerable 
attention to ecstasy in his Conferences. For Cassian, ecstasy is the highest level of per-
fection, and requires a deep and thorough self-transformation. Only then, when all evil 
thoughts are controlled and eliminated, can the soul achieve contemplation of the in-
visible and gaze at God.118 Cassian then writes about a method of disconnecting from all 
distractions and attaining a pure state of prayer in which the intellect is emptied of all 
thoughts and images by the recitation of psalms, and is set on fire: ecstasy.119 In addition, 
Cassian describes the practice of this ecstasy as part of the way of life of the anchorites, 
whose solitude and freedom from all stimuli permit a state of permanent ecstasy, a  
freedom that he himself lost when the desert became disturbingly populated.120 The fact 
that the concept of ecstasy became a practice is reflected in the Christian writings of the 
period, namely descriptions of individuals’ way of life. In ‘The Sayings of the Desert 
Fathers’ (Apophtegmata patrum) in particular, ecstasy is practiced as means of with-
drawing into oneself and encountering God.121 This is also the case in other texts that 
describe the anchoritic life, such as the Historia Lausiaca of Palladius, the Spiritual 
Meadow of John Moschus, and the writings of John of Ephesus on the Eastern Fathers.122 
Ecstasy became a common practice, not only of anchorite monks, but also for coenobitic 
or semi-coenobitic monks.123 Just as in Tertullian’s De anima, so here too ecstasy is 
sometimes accompanied by vision (Greek: theōria) and prophecy, which are narrated and 
referred to after the being experienced.124  
                                                 
118 John Cassian, Conferences, eds. Michael Petschenig, Gottfried Kreuz. Collationes (Vienna: Vienna: 
Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, “CSEL 13,” 2004) iii.7.2-3 (pp. 74-75).  
119 “And so our mind will reach that incorruptible prayer to which in our former treatise, as the Lord 
vouchsafed to grant, the scheme of our Conference mounted, and this is not merely not engaged in gazing 
on any image, but is actually distinguished by the use of no words or utterances; but with the purpose of the 
mind all on fire, is produced through ecstasy of heart by some unaccountable keenness of spirit, and the 
mind being thus affected without the aid of the senses or any visible material pours it forth to God with 
groaning and sighs that cannot be uttered,” ibid., x.11.6 (p. 305), trans. Edgar C. S. Gibson.  
120 Ibid., xix.5.1-2 (p. 538). 
121 Les Apophtegmes des Pères: Collection systématique, ed. and trans. Jean-Claude Guy (Paris: Éd. du 
Cerf, “SC 387, 474 , 498,”  993-2005) iii.31 (vol. 1, p. 166), iii.38 (vol. 1, pp. 170-172), vii.52 (vol. 1, p. 
384), ix.16 (vol. 1, p. 440), xviii.10 (vol. 3, pp. 50-52), xviii.27 (vol. 3, pp. 80-82).  
122 Palladius, La Storia Lausiaca, ed. G. J. M. Bartelink, trans., Marino Barchiesi (Milan: Arnoldo 
Mondadori, 1990) 1 (p. 17), 17 (p. 72). John Moschus, Le Pré Spirituel, ed. and trans. M.-J. Rouët de 
Journal (Paris: Éd. du Cerf, “SC 12,” 1946) chs. 16, 19 (pp. 57, 59-60). John of Ephesus, Lives of the 
Eastern Saints, PO 82/17:214-220, 229.   
123 Les Apophtegmes des Pères, op. cit., iii.33 (vol. 1, p.166).  
124 Les Apophtegmes des Pères, op. cit., vii.52 (vol. 1, p. 384), xviii.27 (vol. 3, pp. 80-82). Palladius, op. 
cit. 1 (p. 18), 38 (pp. 192-202). See the prophecy of Didumos whose vision announces the death of emperor 
Julian (ibid., 4, p. 28).The same is narrated by Sozomen, Histoire Ecclésiastique, ed. J. Bidez and G. C. 
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The link between the Christians and Neoplatonists in reference to the practice of ec-
stasy is found in two late antique Christian texts: The Divine Names by Pseudo-Dionysius, 
and, in the seventh century, The Ladder of Divine Ascent by John Climacus. Both texts 
are famous for the use they make of the Neoplatonist practice of self-reflection as a 
means of attaining the divine by framing it within a Christian theological structure. In the 
center they place the psuchē as a distinct part of the human being that could and should 
aspire to disconnect itself from the other parts in order to attain the divine.125 As for 
ecstasy, Pseudo-Dionysius makes it clear that this is not just a human movement, but also 
comes from God. He explains Paul’s seizure by ecstasy as a product of yearning for God, 
which only the soul can attain because it is the only part of the human being that can 
negate both sense-perception and mind, as well as human reason.126  
Nevertheless, even if these writings give the impression that ecstasy has become an 
accepted social norm, other texts portray a totally different image and use the same term 
ekstasis in a negative sense. Laura Nasrallah has revealed that this use was embedded in 
the political movement against prophetic groups of Christians, such as those described in 
the anti-Phrygian discourse in Epiphanius’ Panarion.127 This is also the view, for example, 
of Eusebius, who speaks about ‘false ecstasy’ as an indication of false prophets.128 Thus 
although ecstasy was elaborated in Christian writings as a theological practice, it also 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hansen, trans. André-Jean Festugière, 4 vols. (Paris: Éd. du Cerf, “SC 306, 418, 495, 516,” 1983-1996) 
vi.2.6-8 (vol. 3, pp. 252-254).  
125 Both Ps.-Dionysius and John Climacus emphasize the disconnection of awareness from mind. For 
Climachus see PG 88:969, 1065, 1108. See especially the final steps 26-29 in his Ladder. For Ps.-Dio-
nysius and the cessation of mental activities as a means to know God: Corpus Dionysiacum, I: De Divinis 
Nominibus, ed. Beate Regina Suchla (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1990) i.4 (=592c-593a, pp. 114-115), iv.5-9 
(=700d-705b, pp. 149-153), vii.1-3 (=865b-872b, pp. 193-198) where human mind is contrasted with the 
divine mind, and thus needs to be abandoned. See also John. D. Jones, “The character of the negative 
(mystical) theology for Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philoso-
phical Association 51 (1977): 66-74.  
126 Which are both not from God, and thus need to be abandoned: Ps-Dionysius, op. cit., iv.13 (=712a, pp. 
158-159) where he refers to Paul’s descriptions in his epistles (Gal 2:20, II Cor. 5:13). And his summary on 
the necessity of ecstasy and the limits in following God: ibid., xiii.3 (=980d-981, pp. 229-230).  
127 Nasrallah, op. cit, ch. 5: ‘ “An Ecstasy of Folly”: The Sound and Unsound Mind in Epiphanius’s 
Anti-Phrygian Source.’  
128 In reference to the false prophets of Montanus Eusebius cites a description of an author who was in 
Ancyra in Galatia, and who describes the acts of the ‘pseudo-prophets:’ Eusebius of Caesarea, ecclésiastique, 
ed. and trans. Gustave Bardy, index by Pierre Périchon, 4 vols. (Paris: Éd. du Cerf, “SC 31, 41, 55, 73,” 
1952-1967) v.14-16 (vol. 2, pp. 45ff). He also describes the same in Mysia on the Phrygian border in 
Ardabau, where Montanus was taken by a false ecstasy (Greek: en katochēi tini kai parekstasei genomenon, 
v.16.7, vol. 2, p. 48), and he started to talk and pronounce strange words and to prophesize in a way 
completely different than the traditional. Eusebius continues to describe the activities of this Montanus his 
followers, but mention also his opponents (loc. cit.). He describes the symptoms of ‘false ecstasy’ which 
starts by a voluntary delirium, and arrives to an involuntary delirium of the soul (ibid., v.17, vol. 2, pp. 53-
54).  
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became a symptom of heresies and a way of identifying false prophets. But even within 
monastic literature itself ecstasy acquired a negative meaning, since it was also used to 
designate the dangers and failures of anchorite life, where it was possible to fall into 
madness.129 This is prominent in the writings of Evagrius Ponticus (345–399).130 In his 
treaty On Thoughts he describes the conditions required to embrace the anchoritic life, 
and specifies that monks who are not ready risk falling into states of madness (ekstaseis). 
He himself, he writes, has known cases of monks who had sunk into states like this (i.e. 
madness), and were trapped in visions of images and demons, forgetting their human 
state.131 Cases such as these are also recorded in other sources, and give a much more 
complex picture of the religious use of ecstasy.132 It is exactly to such a complexity that 
Iamblichus addresses himself. 
A follower of Plotinus, Iamblichus sets out a distinction in the perception of ecstasy as 
theurgic practice in his treaty ‘On the Mysteries.’133  In the part of his treaty that deals with 
divination he responds at length to Porphyry on this topic. Porphyry, writes Iamblichus, 
considered religious and medical ecstasy to be equivalent, and concluded that all forms of 
divinations (which were seen as belonging to divine ecstasy) are in fact forms of medical 
illness inflicted by sick demons.134 Iamblichus, on the other hand, differentiates the 
ecstasy which is a product of corporeal illness (Greek: ta nosēmata tou sōmatos) as in 
cases of melancholia, drunkenness or rabies) from divine ecstasy.135 The whole of his 
writing on ecstasy (book iii, according to a much later division) aims at distinguishing 
                                                 
129 For ecstasy as madness see for example the explanation of Eusebius who designates the anti-Christian 
rage of Diocletian as a disease (Greek: nosos), which caused his dianoia (not his psuchē) to fall into ek-
stasis (ibid., viii.13.11, vol. 3, p. 30).  
130 Evagrius Ponticus speaks about distraction of the mind as ekstasis phrenōn, equivalent to mania and 
caused by demons: Evagrius Ponticus, Traité pratique ou le moine, eds. and trans. Antoine Guillaumont 
and Claire Guillaumont (Paris: Éd. du Cerf, “SC 170, 171,” 1971) chs. 14, 46.  
131 Evagrius Ponticus, Sur les pensées, eds. and trans. Paul Géhin and Claire Guillaumont (Paris: Éd. du 
Cerf, “SC 438,” 1998) ch. 23 (pp. 232-235). More on ecstasy as an attack of demons: Evagrius, Traité pra-
tique ou le moine, op. cit., ch. 14 (vol.2, pp. 532-534). We shall not refer here to the connection between 
ecstasy, false visions and demon possession, although this is a relevant issue, following Inbar Graiver. Self-
Transformation in Early Christian Asceticism (Phd dissertation currently under preparation at the School of 
Historical Studies, Tel Aviv University). 
132 See father Antonius’ description of monks whose repeated independent efforts, without the guidance 
of a spiritual father, brought them to a state of ecstasy (Greek: ekstasis phrenōn): Les Apophtegmes des 
Pères, xi.1 (vol. 2, p.136). See Angelo Gianfrancesco, “Monachisme ancien et psychopathologie: Ancient 
monasticism and psychopathology,” L’évolution psychiatrique 73 (2008): 105-126.   
133 For the dating of this treaty see: Iamblichus, On the Mysteries, ed. Edouard Des Places, trans. Emma 
C. Clarke, Johns M. Dillon, Jackson P. Hershbell (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, Atlanta, 2003) p. 
xxvii, n. 46.   
134 Ibid., iii (p. 118ff), in particular iii.7 (p. 134), iii.25 (pp. 178-182), iii.31 (p. 194ff).  
135 Ibid., iii.25 (pp. 178-182).  
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between the two ambiguous states (Greek: amphibolai katastaseis) of ekstasis.136 He 
attributes the term ‘the act of being inspired’ (to enthousian estin) to the ekstasis which 
originates from the gods, in order to differentiate it from the ekstasis which accompanies 
diseases of the body.137  
As Miller has shown, unlike Plotinus Iamblichus thought that the soul cannot recover 
its own divinity by herself but needed divine intervention.138 Being enthousiasmos, ‘in-
spired,’ is exactly such an intervention in the form of ‘divine ecstasy,’ ‘divine mania,’ 
while mere ekstasis is a disease of the body. His explanation is based on the application 
of Plotinus’ ideas to his own concepts about the soul.139 Iamblichus is replying here to 
Christians (atheoi) who blamed the Pagans for madness inflicted by the devil as part of 
their divine practices.140 As a follower of Plotinus, he replies that divine inspiration (to 
enthousian) does not come from man and is not a faculty (dunamis) of the soul.141 It can 
only come from above, and attract the soul towards the Intellect. All other forms of 
ecstasy, which are false divinations, come from man who wishes to connect to the divine, 
although divinations cannot originate from man.142 Iamblichus thus distinguishes between 
religious and medical states of ecstasy, according to their origin. The origin of the first is 
divine, while the second is a disease of the body. The distinction that he tries to make 
between the theurgical and medical dimensions, works perfectly well as a theoretical 
philosophical discussion. In fact we find the same distinction in Epiphanius’ discussion 
‘On the faith,’ which is part of his Panarion. He too uses enthousiōsis for religious 
ecstasy.143 
 
To conclude 
We have followed the development of a religious, theological and philosophical 
discourse starting from the second century AD in view of the question: how to con-
ceptualize and articulate the act of conversion as an individual process of mental 
transformation. To this end the concept of the soul, the Greek psuchē, proved to be 
indispensible, and moreover a unique term that could be remodeled to suit the ways in 
                                                 
136 Ibid.,iii.25.9-10 (p. 182).  
137 Ibid., iii.8 (p. 136), iii.25 (pp. 180-182). 
138 Miller, “Shifting Selves in Late Antiquity,” pp. 24-25.  
139 See here the captivating analysis of Gregory Shaw, “Containing ecstasy: the strategies of Iamblichean 
theurgy,” Dionysius 21 (2003) pp. 53-87.  
140 Hence he covers all kinds of Pagan practices of divination in his explanation.  
141 Iamblichus, op. cit., iii.7-8 (pp. 134-136). 
142 Ibid., iii.22 (p. 174), iii.27 (p. 186).  
143 Epiphanius of Salamis, De fide, 11.3 (in id., Works, ed. Karl Holl, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1980-
2013, vol. 3, p. 511). Cf. his previous paragraph on ecstatic practices in the festivities of Kronos in Egypt. 
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which conversion (be it a religious or philosophical concept) was perceived, explained 
and in fact modeled. More than revealing distinct discourses of Gnostics, Orthodox 
Christians, and Neoplatonists, this analysis attests to a common and shared psychological 
language, which used what we can term as ‘the instrumentalization of the human soul’ in 
order to set processes of mental transformation. Constructing psychology as a practice 
was the main objective of these thinkers. The concept of the human psuchē seems to 
serve as their means. 
       
 
 
